Studies made by the Public Examination Committee on diverse data, facts and figures relating to conflicts, regional media markets, local media laws and policy pursued by local authorities, have revealed a number of starkly different media models (The various media classification theories put forward by both foreign and domestic media researchers were unfortunately found unsuitable for our methods of investigation. The bulk of these media classification theories are the result of various attempts to comprehend the press, but in no way to understand what it actually is and what part it plays in society. For instance, the authors of the publication entitled "Four Theories of the Press", Sibert, Schramm and Peterson, have placed diverse press systems in the following four categories: authoritarian, liberal, socially responsible and Soviet. Excepting the so-called "Soviet model" which was taken from real life (to be exact, from the Western view of Soviet life in the 1950s), the rest of the models are far from able to credibly describe the real mass media systems in any country, but are actually prescriptive. The same approach stands out in the papers published by Raymond Williams (Williams R. Communications, London, Penguin 62) where the author also singles out four press systems, namely: authoritarian, paternal, commercial and democratic. It should be noted that the investigator, who proposed his own classification, failed to find any convincing example of the embodiment of, for example, the democratic model. Denis Manuel, author of "Theory of Mass Communication", followed the same classification principle. Apart from the above-mentioned models, he studied the model of developing countries and the democratic participation model. The method of classification he used is also based on standard principles. To put it another way, the researcher enumerated what must be done but failed to classify the real media situation.) As noted above, during the first stage of the research, one of the project committee's major conclusions was that 89 distinct political regimes now exist in Russia, distinguished from one another by factors that play extremely significant roles in people's everyday lives.

These differences have always existed, but they were concealed by the strong armor of the communist system and its single, standard set of rules for Party control of the media. This included a standard personnel policy and censorship rules, centralized funding, and uniformly strict directives in the sphere of ideology and information.

Cracking the Communist (1991) and then Soviet (1993) armor-shielded systems triggered off a violent process of divergence of regional regimes, acquiring the name of the "parade of sovereignties." Interregional differences started to build up rapidly, primarily in the spheres of legitimization of authority (institutional-public, charismatic and traditional methods) and interaction between those involved in the political process (dictatorship, wars between elites, consensus reached by the elite on the basis of balance of interests, pluralism and the like). The rapid increase in economic, political and cultural differences between different areas of Russia was the key factor in their divergence.

Particular mass media models play a crucial role in the process of forming and perpetuating political regimes.

The principal distinction of each from the others rests in what part mass media and journalists play in the regions and what their role is in perpetuating cultural, economic, political and social relations. Their role and place are dependent upon a number of factors which together compose the overall regional mass media tableau.

The real mass media tableau in a particular region is revealed when a certain policy followed by local authorities comes into conflict with the behavior of the media, which in its turn depends upon the development, economic status, infrastructure, informational demands and purchasing power of the population, editing and reporting staff, local traditions and the like.

When media behavior goes beyond the scope of the policy dictated by local authorities, conflict arises. The real classification of regional mass media patterns can be formulated on the basis of the following seven factors:

1. Informational openness of local administrations (high, medium and low)
2. Freedom of production of information
3. Freedom of distribution of information
4. Media density
5. Development of regional mass media and advertising markets
6. Level of media conflict; nature of conflicts (legal/extralegal)
7. Level and type of self-organization of the media community

The first three parameters determine the typological characteristics of the media policy pursued by authorities. The fourth and fifth parameters characterize the potential, overall capacity and nature, market-related or otherwise, of local mass media. The sixth point on the frequency of conflicts is, to a large extent, derived from the first five. The seventh parameter, level and type of self-organization of the media community, has much to do with the other six factors, but also has its own logic of development.

The typological classification in this study was based on an underlying process. Mass media, like the nation as a whole, are in transition from the Soviet model toward something else - something signified in the Constitution by the words "democracy", "human rights" and "market economy." For the mass media, this means press freedom and economic independence.

In practice, upon emerging from same "Soviet overcoat," Russian regions spread out in different directions. Traveling through Russia in the year 2000, one can find oneself in the 1950s or the 1930s. Medieval dictatorships can be found alongside Chicago-style gangland chaos in one nation.

Thus, the starting point of the transformation of each Russian region was the Soviet model, but their final destinations vary widely.

For some regions, the entire transformation process is going on within the Soviet media model. One may single out the following three versions of the Soviet media model: authoritarian, paternalistic and modernized. These are all versions of the Soviet pattern, inasmuch as mass media in regions with this model still take their instructions and funding from above, sanctions are still imposed for dissent, etc. These traits are inherent in all three Soviet media models, the difference manifesting itself in the form, methods and manner of the "party leadership", the extent of intolerance towards dissent and the structural organization and maturity of media companies. The same methods can not be used to control impoverished journalists in devastated Kalmykia, where the bulk of advertising goes through central TV, as are used in relatively rich Tatarstan, where the advertising market allows the local media to feel somewhat protected. Nevertheless, fundamental media activity in regions with variations of the Soviet model remains under the stringent control of local authorities.

Government officials in all territories of Russia want control over the press and differ only in the opportunities they have to take it. Where such opportunities are few, formation of a media market is the fundamental media process. Officials are still trying to keep mass media and the flow of information under control, but the process of obtaining, processing and disseminating information is no longer governed by Soviet principles.

Firstly, this holds true for those regions where the market media model is prevalent, where no official can command and keep control over the media. It would obviously sound ridiculous if, for example, Mr. Rossel or Moscow Mayor Luzhkov tried to pass a statute dictating the coverage of an event, or openly give instructions to journalists on how to cover a certain topic. Authorities naturally cannot remain indifferent to what is going on in the press, but in the market model, direct control of the media is replaced by influence over it. Mechanisms of civilized influence over the press are much more complicated, delicate and intricate than the simple Soviet transformation of the media into "Party lackeys." One needs to know how to create information opportunities, follow ratings and talk to all journalists, not only loyal ones.

If a particular administration cannot do this or finds it unnecessary to learn, and instead tries to issue dictates to modern, developed, independent media, the market mass media model is likely to give rise to a confrontational one, in which the fundamental media process is the battle between the government and a portion of the independent media community.

In some regions where a Soviet-to-market transitional model is prevalent, media are divided into two equal or unequal groups: state and independent. The fundamental process underlying this model in the changing ratio between these segments.

The seventh and last media model, classified as depressive, occurs in regions characterized by extremely low media density. These are mostly northern and far-eastern autonomous districts where it isn't possible to speak seriously of a media market, where the quality and amount of information is at its lowest level, communication between the authorities and the populace takes place without the mediation of the media, and the scanty informational demands of the population being satisfied by central TV and radio companies.

Following this typological analysis, based as it was on analysis and collation of the facts truly existing in the regions, as opposed to being based on abstract principles, we decided to name the media models according to the names of the regions where mass media practice is most typical for each particular model.

Hence the seven basic regional media models:

1. The Kalmyk-Adygei media model (the authoritarian version of the Soviet media model or "conflict-free zone")
2. Belgorod-Bashkortostan media model (paternalistic version of the Soviet media model or "domestic dictatorship")
3. Kuban-Tatarstan media model (modernized version of Soviet media model or model of controlled press freedom - "father of the people")
4. Soviet-to-market transitional model
5. Sverdlovsk media model (market model)
6. Primorsk Territory - Tula Region model (confrontational)
7. Depressive media model

Each of the above seven models can be regarded as applicable to numerous regions of Russia.

Within each model, the regions may differ from the others in a number of factors.

One and the same media model may be encountered in different Russian territories where members of administrations hold different political opinions. For example, Mr. Starodubtsev, a communist-oriented agrarian, and Mr. Ayatskov, who advocates market principles, despite their diametrically opposed public declarations, encourage the same confrontational mass media model in their regions.

Features of different media models may be found in different areas of a particular region.

Within any one, market-oriented region, the entire mass media and advertising market is concentrated in the capital and about three to five other large cities. Practically all regional or municipal newspapers, of which there are a total of about 2,000 in the country, exist in non-market conditions.

The classification of a region into a particular media model depends on what relations and processes are dominant in that region.

To better understand the fundamental direction in the transformation of regional media and identify the fundamental underlying trend in the Russian media, we must estimate what proportion of Russians live under different mass media conditions.

The results of the analysis given in these two diagrams reveal that the fundamental process of transformation taking place in the Russian media is the process of transition to the market model and this model's supplanting of the numerous variations of the Soviet model.

This process is accompanied by a growth in media freedom.

The diagram given below presents the average indices of media freedom with respect to each of the above seven models. Authoritarian version of Soviet media model Paternalistic version of Soviet media model Modernized version of Soviet media model Soviet-to-Market Transitional Media Model Market media model Confrontational media model based on market principles Depressive media model

It is obvious that mass media freedom is growing together with progress towards the market media model. The highest degree of media freedom can be observed in the regions where market relations are dominant and least in the areas where the authoritarian Soviet media model prevails. The Soviet mass media model as a whole does contain the potential for increasing freedom. This potential ranges from zero freedom (authoritarian version) to a relatively high degree of freedom (modernized version).

The results of the typological analysis of the condition of media in the regions of the Russian Federation complement and are based upon the data obtained and the inferences drawn by the Public Examination committee.

The prime objective of the typological analysis was to create a kind of "periodic table of regional media elements," establishing the patterns and laws that govern the process of development of regional media and related markets, and find effective remedies for its "typical diseases," bearing in mind that our "regional elements," unlike those grouped in Mendeleev's periodic table, are not permanently wed to their media models.

The prime objective pursued by the project committee was to make the various regions of the Russian Federation differ from one another not in their degree of press freedom but in their distinctive schools of journalism, based on diverse cultures and national traditions.

1. Kalmyk-Adygei Mass Media Model

Authoritarian Version of the Soviet Media Model ("Conflict-Free Zone")

This model is primarily typical of those regions where there is relatively low consumer demand for media product and a generally low level of economic development. This model is a combination of rigid, authoritarian media policy on the part of local administrations and low media density. In this model, the advertising market is practically non-existent. The regions following this pattern are amongst the so-called "conflict-free zones." It should be noted, first of all, that very few controversies arise in these regions since the majority of local media and journalists are kept under control by local authorities. Secondly, the authoritarian environment evokes fear and obstructs the flow of unauthorized information, including details of those few media conflicts that do occur in these regions.

The murder of Larisa Yudina, editor of the only independent newspaper in the Republic of Kalmykia, exploded the conflict-free zone in the republic. But we consider this an exception to the rule, evoked by the maladroit reaction of the local regime to the unusual opposition of an individual who tried to resist the status-quo.

The basic characteristics of the Kalmyk-Adygei model are:

• low media density;
• the virtual absence of media independent from local authorities;
• informational opaqueness of the local government and society as a whole and a tendency toward becoming an "informational black hole";
• almost no advertising market;
• a low rate of media conflicts and disputes;
• absence of self-organization in the journalistic

community, which has no real influence;

• local laws and statutes contain numerous provisions that restrict freedom of the press in violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (sometimes local media legislation is completely undeveloped, and media policy is implemented by the government with no basis in law).

One may gain a clearer picture of the type of journalism in this model by examining the situation in a different region, outside Russia. Sometimes, a caricature makes it easier to understand the essence of a particular phenomenon.

In Turkmenistan, the company Turkmen-Bashi is the founder and owner of all newspapers, magazines and TV channels. The following oath can be found in the upper left corner of the front page of almost every newspaper:

The moment I betray my Motherland,
Saparmurat Turkmen-bashi,
Or your sacred banner,
May I cease to breathe.

This example has nothing to do with Russian realities, to be sure. However, this is the extreme to which the model we refer to as a "conflict-free zone" can stretch. The essence of mass media and journalism operating in accordance with this model is the reproduction of the ritual texts, prayers and eulogies of the authorities.

There is no room for media as such in this model. There are only the empty shells of newspapers and magazines, TV and radio. Information as such does not exist, there is only an imitation of it.

Such a media model is extremely dangerous for a region, as it excludes it from the Russian and worldwide information exchange, turning it into an enclave where historical time comes to a halt. There is no built-in mechanism for change and development. The despair of this model in Russia's regions is alleviated by the fact that the regions are within the sphere covered by the national media and federal laws, the application of which could change the situation.

In addition to the Kalmyk and Adygei Republics, the model under consideration can be found in Mordovia, North Osetia-Alania, Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan, Khakasia, Mari-El and Karachaevo-Cherkess Republics.

4.36% of the Russian population live in regions pervaded by the conditions created within this model.

2. Belgorod-Bashkortostan Model

Paternalistic Version of the Soviet Media Model

This is a Soviet media model that has remained intact since the 1930s - 1950s. The typical features of this model are:

• high media density, largely due to the high number of newspaper and magazine subscriptions (hence, the popular reference to the Soviet people as "the world's most avid readers");
• a low or medium level of development in the advertising market;
• a large volume of state subsidies for loyal mass media, especially for the press, which makes it possible to maintain a high level of subscription to newspapers and magazines;
• the maintenance by regional authorities of virtually full control over mass media, relying essentially on the high percentage of fully dependent state media, the mechanism of subsidies, virtual censorship and, where necessary, employing the full force of the apparatus of repression: police, courts, tax police, etc.;
• the informational non-transparency of the government. This opaqueness exists as a matter of policy. The authorities do not want transparency, seeking to supply society with information "from above" at their discretion. However, a region cannot turn into an "informational black hole" with this kind of model because the high media density and media development result in unauthorized leaks of information. Besides, it is impossible to fully exclude a region from the nationwide informational tableau;
• a paternalistic policy on production and distribution of loyal media; numerous instances of the Constitution and federal laws being violated by local legislation and the policy of local authorities, all serving to infringe on the rights of mass media;
• a low or medium level of media conflict in the region. It is rather difficult to transform into an absolutely conflict-free zone while operating within this model, because, given the high media density and tight control by the authorities, occasional conflicts in the spirit of a "lone mutineer" are unavoidable. Similar occasional attempts by media and journalists to break loose, which were unthinkable in the past, i.e. in this model's real Soviet prototype, have become possible and inevitable in its present-day version: for neither Belgorod, nor Bashkortostan are separated by an "iron curtain" from the rest of Russia the way the USSR was separated from the rest of the world.

The Belgorod-Bashkortostan model has, in its milder manifestation, arisen in the regions of Orel, Penza, Volgograd, Orenburg and Kostroma. In none of these regions do the authorities dare resort to the crude steam-roller methods of putting pressure on the press that occur in, for example, Bashkortostan. However, the principle itself of an authoritarian and paternalistic organization of power and media set forth in local legislation and seen in the actions of local government can be clearly observed in all of these regions.

Aside from the high media density, this version of the Soviet model differs from the Kalmyk-Adygei model in that here, the authorities do not only seek to perpetuate themselves and use the media to develop the personality cult of the regional leader in the minds of local population, but also aspire to use the mass media to impose their own system of values.

Media and journalism in these regions perform the following four major functions:

• they facilitate the preservation of the existing power elite and the perpetuation of the governmental status quo;
• they pass the government's instructions on to the populace, as well as its evaluation of the current situation and particular events in the region, country and the world;
• they cultivate in individuals the system of values that regional authorities regard as useful and correct;
• they mobilize individuals to take the action the authorities regard as necessary.

The substance, spirit and style of this model are reflected in Decree No. 537 (December 7, 1999) issued by Y. Stroev, Head of the Orel Regional Administration: "On the Implementation of Decree No 19 (13.01.99) of the Chief Executive of the Regional Administration 'On Increasing Media Coverage of Socioeconomic Development of the Region'":

"Earlier this year, the Decree of the Regional Head of Administration entitled "On Increasing Media Coverage of Socioeconomic Development of the Region" was passed. The decree was discussed by virtually all territory and town administrations, the editorial boards of newspapers and TV and radio companies.

In a bid to implement the decree, the journalists of Orel concentrated on the overall coverage of the central theme "The Orel Region on the Threshold of the 21st century." As before, the priority areas include matters of local economic reform, development of the investment process, provision of gas to regional villages and townships, social security, and spirituality problems. The local mass media put emphasis on comprehensive coverage of the multi-faceted work of the "Slavic Roots" program.

At the same time, the level of relations between the press and the authorities is in some cases inadequate. For example, the city of Orel, the regional center, where the most complicated problems of management, economy, public utilities and everyday life are concentrated, has no print publication in which these problems can be discussed.…

The creative potential of regional journalists is clearly underutilized. Few materials are published devoted to the morality and business qualities of the present leader. There are still too many superficial materials that do not touch upon the complexity of existing problems and fail to analyze them. Not all mass media cover the problems of youth with proper insight.

To further increase the role of mass media in covering the socioeconomic life of the region, I hereby decree as follows:

1. To continue, in the year 2000, the work of mass media in stressing the main theme "Orel Region on the Threshold of the 21st Century."
2. The editorial boards of newspapers, TV and radio companies should explain to the population the specific features of the current period of economic, social and political transition of our society. Scholars, specialists and heads of state bodies at all levels should be involved in this process.
3. Mass media should report on the State Duma and presidential election campaigns without bias, from the standpoint of a party genuinely interested in specific projects and results, and in strict compliance with law,.
4. Mass media should intensify organizational work on the local level. They should hold regular editorial board meetings and "round table" discussions, organize telephone counseling hotlines, and public organizations to address citizens' complaints. They should seriously address every letter or call received from readers, TV viewers and radio listeners.
5. To suggest that the Orel Administration and Orel City Council should consider setting up their own mass media and, above all, a public city newspaper.
6. The Department of Information of the Head of the Regional Administration (S.V. Fefelov), Department for the Press, Printing and Mass Media Facilities of the Regional Administration (B.S. Afonin), and the editorial board of the newspaper Pokoleniye (A.D. Mironenko), should take urgent measures to raise the prestige of the regional youth newspaper and enhance its role in the upbringing of the younger generation.
7. Deputy Head of Regional Administration I.Y. Mosyakin shall be in charge of control of the execution of this decree.

   Y.S. Stroev,

   Chief Executive of the Regional Administration As it turns out, no time machine is necessary. All you need is a commonplace Moskvich car, which will take you, in a matter of hours, from the year 2000 to the 1930s-1950s. The Leninist principles of Party control of the press are as alive as ever. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the cited decree are particularly illustrative: here, the Chief Executive of the Administration gives journalists direct instructions as to what they should do and determines the form their work should take.

   Another peculiarity of the Belgorod-Bashkortostan model is this: local authorities are usually on the lookout for developments in the journalistic community. The Regional Union of Journalists more often than not is headed or managed by an official, as is the case in Belgorod, or by the editor of a government paper, a loyal person included in the informal hierarchy of the local government.

   9.5% of Russians live under the information conditions produced by this model.

3. Kuban-Tatarstan Model.

Modernized Version of the Soviet Media Model ("Father of the People")

This media model occurs when the following regional characteristics coincide:

high media density;
a large independent mass media sector;
a large regional budget to support mass media;
the local administration seeks to control major information flows without resorting, as a rule, to direct censorship methods, or gross violations of the freedom of mass media, or of the Constitution and federal legislation; mass media are controlled and subdued largely by economic leverage and the elaboration of the administration's own strong information and image policy;
the government may have a fairly opaque information policy, i.e. only positive information may be made available.

While in the Belgorod-Bashkortostan model the authorities play the role of a "stern father" acting along the ancient principles of "Domostroi," in the Kuban-Tatar version, the authorities project the image of a generous and charismatic "father of the family," where it is unwise and not customary to act in defiance of his will.

This model emerges when a strong, charismatic leader comes to power in a region with considerable budget capability and high potential in the media market. The existing or potential advertising market produces a certain counterbalance to the powerful influence of the state and forces local administrations to co-exist with independent mass media.

This media model may be regarded as transitional, with all the accompanying consequences, the most important of which is the simultaneous co-existence of media of both a market and non-market nature. The large media sector that serves the government coexists (sometimes peacefully, sometimes not quite so peacefully) with media that work on a market basis and are thus forced to perform other functions. The basic difference from the classical model of Soviet-to-market transition consists in virtually full control by the authorities over the main flows of information.

The journalistic community operating under this model is either divided or is under the indirect control of the authorities. By and large, this model certainly should be regarded as more advanced than numerous other models, since it does give independent mass media the chance to grow and contains an intrinsic mechanism for self-adjustment.

Besides Tatarstan and the Krasnodar Territory, this kind of media model is taking shape in Yakutia, Samara, Lipetsk and Ulyanovsk Regions.

9.5% of the Russian population lives in areas where these media conditions are prevalent.

4. Soviet-to-Market Transition Media Model

This is the most common form of media sector organization among the regions of Russia. Its fundamental feature is division of the media sector into two parts, equal and comparable in size: state and independent. In most regions where mass media operate according to a transitional model, the local authorities, while supporting state mass media, foster relations with independent media, their attitude to such media varying from moderate discrimination to discreet circumspection. This is manifest in the accreditation rules, and in providing different economic conditions for state and independent mass media. However, the fundamental feature that distinguishes the transitional model from all versions of the Soviet media model is that the authorities no longer can or no longer want to establish an integrated mass media management system. Recurrences of the Soviet model occur in some documents and the actions of some officials, but they are no longer part of a systematized model.

The process of emergence of the media market breaks from the Soviet model, first, in regions where the process itself is most intense, and second, in regions where the resources (political, financial, administrative) of the Soviet model prove to be weakest. For this reason, given the advanced media market of Tatarstan, for example, it is the Soviet media model that is perpetuated there, albeit modernized and geared to the market. In the case of a far less developed media market like that of the Novgorod or Murmansk Region, we have a transitional model. The varying extent of the Soviet model's resistance and adaptability leads to correspondingly varying results.

In terms of advancement towards the market model, initial, intermediate and final phases may be distinguished. Over one third of Russia's population, in 32 regions, live under the conditions of the transition model.

5. Sverdlovsk Model (Market Media Model)

This is a Russian version of the market media model. Its main features are:

high media density;
a large media advertising budget;
independent media dominate the market;
the authorities are compelled to put up with the media as a significant and partially independent factor in the politics and economy of the region;
a high rate of media conflicts;
the level of criminal violence against journalists is above average.

The last two parameters stem from the impossibility of managing the economically independent media using purely administrative methods, and the urge to divide up the strategically important media market, which together result in a situation where conflicts and crime are on the rise.

Under a market model, mass media acquire a different nature: they are transformed into a business. The ensuing function of deriving profit from information and making news a commodity changes the nature of journalism and mass media management: the agitators and propagandists of the Soviet era and romanticists of the perestroika period, publishing papers "for their friends" and musing about "the likely response to our word," give way to strict media managers and market analysts.

The market model is characterized by a regional media budget structure in which the majority of money comes from advertising rather than the state.

The relations between local government and mass media in the case of the market model are far from idyllic. With the market model, too, the official is no "friend of the free press." As before, he tries to classify, filter and regulate the flow of information, force the media to serve him, and manipulate public opinion. However, he uses market methods to achieve this, admitting that it is impossible nowadays to give commands to the press and expect it to comply easily. If, despite all the indications of a market model being in place, the authorities still try to subdue independent media using administrative methods, a different model emerges: the "confrontational" model.

For all the disadvantages of the market media model associated, above all, with the pathologies of the Russian market (i.e. the market as a whole, not only the media market), this model enables mass media to develop, and finds an internal mechanism and source of self-improvement in the creation of a media market infrastructure and enhancement of the role of self-regulation in the media and, particularly, the journalistic community.

In the case of this model, usually the number of reports of actual media conflicts increases. Sverdlovsk Region, the most market-oriented region, is a leader as far as media conflicts are concerned. First of all, the market media model is more conflict-prone than any version of the Soviet model. Second, under the conditions of this model, unlike other models where reporting is a problem, it is impossible to keep any information secret. Therefore, virtually all conflicts in the media sphere become known to all.

Also, there exists an obvious relationship between the development of the media market and the level of press freedom. At least 11 out of 12 regions practicing the market media model exhibit higher indices of press freedom than the other regions of Russia.

Besides Sverdlovsk Region, the market media model is applied in Kemerovo, Irkutsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Perm, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod Regions and in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

23% of the population of Russia live under the conditions of the market media model.

6. Primorsk-Tula Model ("confrontational")

This media construction results from the head-on collision of authoritarian policy pursued by regional authorities with economically independent mass media with roots in an advanced advertising market and strong journalistic traditions. Following are the main features of this "confrontational" model:

high media density;
a large proportion of mass media independent of the authorities;
an advanced advertising market;
an opaque information policy on the part of regional authorities;
an attempt to pursue an authoritarian policy toward the media in the region;
a high rate of conflicts in the media sphere.

The emergence of the "confrontational" model may be provoked by an intra-regional "war" of political groups or a collision of economic interests, or an attempt to redistribute property in the region (which is usually the true motive of regional political wars).

Unlike the Soviet model, in which the authorities also sometimes struggle with independent media, in the case of the confrontational model, the authorities do not have the solid pretext of societal values as the basis on which to wage war. In a confrontational model, the leader or elite group does its best to perpetuate itself, rather than just its ideological legacy. Therefore, the confrontational model differs from the Soviet one in the absence of any rules for combating dissent. The confrontational model may emerge from a market as well as from a Soviet model.

The Primorsk-Tula model is practiced in: Krasnoyarsk Territory, Bryansk, Voronezh, Omsk, Kaliningrad, Rostov, Saratov Regions, with Kursk Region also gravitating towards it. There are signs of the confrontational model emerging in Volgograd Region and some other regions.

10% of Russia's population live under the conditions of the confrontational model.

7. Depressive Media Model ("Media Tundra")

It is difficult to speak of press freedom, media policy and a mass media market in regions where one can barely find a single settlement with a dozen deer breeders over a thousand kilometers of snow drifts, and where the regional capital is a town whose information requirements are easily met by a couple of local newspapers and one local radio station.
Extremely low media density, poor quality of mass media, total absence of any signs of media or advertising markets - such are the information conditions under which 1.9% of Russians live in eleven territorial entities of the federation: Altai and Tuva Republics; Agin-Buryat, Komi-Permyak, Koryak, Nenets, Taimyr, Ust-Orda, Chukot and Evenki Autonomous Districts and the Jewish Autonomous Region.